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Abstract: In this paper, we study the occurrence of local indeterminacy in two-sector
monetary economies. In order to capture the credit market imperfections and the liquid-
ity services of money, we consider a general MIUF model with two alternative timings in
monetary payments: the Cash-In-Advance timing, in which the cash available to buy goods
is money in the consumers’ hands after they leave the bond market but before they en-
ter the goods market, and the Cash-After-the-Market timing, in which agents hold money
for transactions after leaving the goods market. We consider three standard specifications
of preferences: the additively separable formulation, the Greenwood-Hercovitz-Huffman
(GHH) [18] formulation and the King-Plosser-Rebelo (KPR) [21] formulation. First, we
show that for all the three types of preferences, local indeterminacy easily arises under the
CIA timing with a low enough interest rate elasticity of money demand. Second, we show
that with the CAM timing, determinacy always holds under separable preferences, but local
indeterminacy can arise in the case of GHH and KPR preferences. We thus prove that
compared to aggregate models, two-sector models provide new rooms for local indetermi-
nacy when non-separable standard preferences are considered.
Keywords: Money-in-the-utility-function, Indeterminacy, Sunspot equilibria.
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1 Introduction
A wide-spread perception among economists is that macroeconomic business-
cycle fluctuations are not driven only by shocks on technologies or prefer-
ences, but also by changes in expectations about the fundamentals. The
2008 financial crisis is a good illustration to show how coordination failures
in the monetary market and self-fulfilling prophecies can have dramatic ef-
fects either on the stock or the goods market, and account for the observed
macroeconomic fluctuations to a large extent.
A major strand of the literature focussing on fluctuations derived from
agents’ beliefs is based on the concept of sunspot equilibria that dates back
to the early works of Shell [26], Azariadis [1] and Cass and Shell [12]. As
shown by Woodford [30], the existence of sunspot equilibria is closely related
to the equilibrium indeterminacy under perfect foresight, i.e. the existence
of a continuum of equilibrium paths converging toward one steady state from
the same initial value of the state variable.
It is well-known that equilibrium indeterminacy can arise in monetary
models in which the central bank follows an exogenous money growth rule.1
Transactions need money and a standard approach consists in assuming that
agents face borrowing constraints, demanding money and bearing the oppor-
tunity cost of a nominal interest rate.2 In order to capture the transactions
motive for money holding, the Money-In-the-Utility-Function (MIUF) ap-
proach is widely used in the literature as it generalizes either the transactions
cost or the shopping time models as shown by Feenstra [16].3
However, the timing of transactions matters depending on the way real
balances enter the utility function. On the one hand, with the Cash-In-
Advance (CIA) timing, the cash available to buy goods is money in the
consumers’ hands after they leave the bond market but before they en-
ter the goods market. Under this timing and a Leontief utility function,
the MIUF model reduces to the Clower [13] constraint.4 Within aggregate
models, local indeterminacy easily arises under a CIA timing and requires a
sufficiently weak elasticity of intertemporal substitution, together with dom-
inant income effects, i.e. a low enough interest elasticity of money demand.5
1See Michener and Ravikumar [24] for a survey.
2See for instance Barinci and Che´ron [2], Woodford [31].
3See Farmer [15], Matsuyama [23].
4In the spirit of Clower, the reader is also referred to Grandmont and Youne`s [17] for
a partial constraint, Stockman [28] for capital accumulation, Lucas and Stokey [22] for a
cash-credit approach.
5See, Carlstrom and Fuerst [11], Cooley and Hansen [14].
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On the other hand, the traditional Sidrauski [27] view implies that end-of-
period real balances enter the utility function.6 As agents hold money for
transactions after leaving the goods market, this timing is called Cash-After-
the-Market (CAM), and whithin an aggregate economy with production, it
implies that indeterminacy never arises.7 The aim of our paper is to explore
the robustness of those conclusions within a monetary two-sector economy.
The main motivation to consider a two-sector model is that local indeter-
minacy has been shown to occur much more easily in such a framework than
within aggregate models. The shifting of resources between the productions
of the two goods provides indeed new mechanisms through the implied vari-
ations of prices. This is true at the same time in real models with productive
externalities,8 and in monetary models with fractional CIA constraint.9 In
this paper, we investigate whether two-sector models also provide new rooms
for local indeterminacy when a general MIUF formulation is considered.
While the production side is based on the consideration of general tech-
nologies, the side of preferences is defined on the ground of three different
specifications of the utility function which are commonly used in the busi-
ness cycle and growth literature: i) an additively separable formulation, ii) a
King, Plosser and Rebelo [21] (KPR) formulation which is compatible with
balanced growth, and finally iii) a Greenwood, Hercovitz and Huffman [18]
(GHH) formulation for which the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and real money balances depends on the latter only. The CIA and
CAM timings are systematically compared throughout the paper. Consid-
ering the CIA timing, we first generalize the conclusions obtained by Bosi,
Magris and Venditti [9] in a two-sector economy with CIA constraint : lo-
cal indeterminacy requires a low enough interest rate elasticity of money
demand.10 Second, and contrary to the aggregate formulation, we high-
light the possible existence of local indeterminacy in two-sector monetary
economies with a CAM timing depending on the utility function. While
we show that the determinacy result is robust under additively separable
preferences, we prove that this is no longer the case with non-separable
preferences by providing simple sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy
6See also Brock [10].
7See Carlstrom and Fuerst [11] in which this timing is called Cash-When-I’m-Done.
8See for instance Benhabib and Nishimura [6] in which it is shown that local indeter-
minacy arises under constant social returns to scale if there is a capital intensity reversal
between the private and the social levels.
9See for instance Bosi, Magris and Venditti [8] in which it is shown that local inde-
terminacy occurs without any restriction on the utility function is the share of liquidity
constraint is low enough, i.e. if the stationary velocity of money is large enough.
10The same restriction is necessary in aggregate models (see Carlstrom and Fuerst [11]).
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in the case of GHH [18] and KPR [21] utility functions. Explicit examples
with CES technologies illustrate these theoretical findings. Summing up, the
novelty of the paper not only rests on a more general (bi-sectoral) MIUF
approach to the CIA timing where indeterminacy more likely arises, but also
on the occurrence of indeterminacy under a CAM timing (never shown in
literature) with heterogeneous technologies and non-separable preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the ba-
sic model, defines the intertemporal equilibrium and proves the existence
of a steady state. In Section 3, we present our main results by focussing
successively on additively separable, GHH and KPR preferences. Section
5 illustrates our conclusions through a simple example. Section 6 contains
concluding comments and all the proofs are in a final Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Technology
The basic model is a two-sector optimal growth model. We assume that there
are two commodities with one consumption good y0 and one capital good
y. The labor supply is assumed to be inelastic. Total labor is normalised to
1 and each good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology:
y0 = f0(k0, l0), y = f1(k1, l1)
with k0 + k1 ≤ k, k being the total stock of capital, and l0 + l1 ≤ 1.
Assumption 1. Each production function f i : R2+ → R+, i = 0, 1, is C2,
increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such
that for any x > 0, f i1(0, x) = f
i
2(x, 0) = +∞, f i1(+∞, x) = f i2(x,+∞) = 0.
By definition we have y ≤ f1(k, 1). The monotonicity properties and the
Inada conditions in Assumption 1 imply that there exists k¯ > 0 solution of
k − f1(k, 1) = 0 such that f1(k, 1) > k when k < k¯, and f1(k, 1) < k when
k > k¯. It follows that it is not possible to maintain stocks beyond k¯. The
set of admissible pairs (k, y) is thus defined as follows
D = {(k, y) ∈ R2+| 0 ≤ k ≤ k¯, 0 ≤ y ≤ f1(k, 1)} (1)
There are two representative firms, one for each sector. For any given
(k, y), profit maximization is equivalent to solving the following problem of
optimal allocation of productive factors between the two sectors:
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T (k, y) = max
k0,k1,l0,l1
f0(k0, l0)
s.t. y ≤ f1(k1, l1)
k0 + k1 ≤ k
l0 + l1 ≤ 1
k0, k1, l0, l1 ≥ 0
(2)
The social production function T (k, y) describes the frontier of the produc-
tion possibility set associated with interior temporary equilibria such that
(k, y) ∈ D, and gives the maximal output of the consumption good. Un-
der Assumption 1, for any (k, y) ∈ D, T (k, y) can be shown to be concave
and twice continuously differentiable.11 Denoting w the wage rate, r the
gross rental rate of capital and p the price of investment good, all in terms
of the price of the consumption good, we formulate the aggregate profit
maximization problem as follows
max
(k,y)∈D
T (k, y, `) + py − rk − w` (3)
and we derive that for any (k, y) ∈ intD, with intD denoting the interior of
the set D, the first order derivatives of the social production function give
T1(k, y) = r, T2(k, y) = −p (4)
Buiding on the constant returns to scale, it follows that the wage rate sat-
isfies T (k, y) + py = rk + w.
2.2 Preferences
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived
agents. We will assume without loss of generality that the total popula-
tion is constant. In each period t ≥ 0, each consumer receives income from
capital, labor, money and lump-sum transfers from the government. His ex-
penditures concern the consumption good, the investment good and money
for the next period t + 1. Let us then denote by Mt the stock of money
at time t. In each period t ≥ 0, the representative agent is subject to the
budget constraint
qˆtct + pˆtyt +Mt+1 = rˆtkt + wˆt +Mt + τˆt (5)
where qˆt is the price of the consumption good, pˆt is the price of the invest-
ment good, rˆt is the rental rate of capital, wˆt is the wage rate and τˆ is the
11See Benhabib and Nishimura [4].
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nominal lump-sum transfers issued by the government. Choosing the con-
sumption good as the nume´raire, i.e. dividing equation (5) by qˆt, gives the
following formulation for the budget constraint
ct + ptyt + qtMt+1 = rtkt + wt + qtMt + τt (6)
with pt = pˆt/qˆt, qt = 1/qˆt, rt = rˆt/qˆt, wt = wˆt/qˆt and τt = τˆt/qˆt. Money in
real terms is thus given by qtMt.
The per-period utility function u(ct, qtMt) depends on consumption ct
and real money balances denoted now qtMt. In the literature, there are
indeed two typical choices for the formulation of the cash that facilitates
trading at time t. The first one, used for instance by Woodford [31], corre-
sponds to the cash the household has in advance of goods-market trading,
namely
Mt = Mt (7)
and is called Cash-In-Advance (CIA) timing. The second formulation, used
for instance by Matsuyama [23], corresponds to the cash left to the household
after leaving the goods market, namely
Mt = Mt+1 (8)
and is called Cash-After-the-Market (CAM) timing.
Considering that Mt = Mt or Mt+1, the per-period utility function
satisfies the following basic restrictions:
Assumption 2. u(c, qM) is C2, increasing in each argument, concave and
satisfies the boundary conditions limqM→0 u2(x, qM)/u1(x, qM) = +∞,
limqM→+∞ u2(x, qM)/u1(x, qM) = 0 for any x > 0.
We also introduce a standard normality assumption between consumption
c and real money balances qM
Assumption 3. Consumption c and real money balances qM are normal
goods.
The consumption of the representative agent at time t is given by ct =
T (kt, yt), and the capital accumulation equation is such that
kt+1 = yt + (1− δ)kt (9)
with δ ∈ [0, 1] the rate of depreciation of capital. The intertemporal max-
imisation program of the representative agent is then as follows
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max
{ct,kt+1,Mt+1}+∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, qtMt)
s.t. ct + pt[kt+1 − (1− δ)kt] + qtMt+1 = rtkt + wt + qtMt + τt
k0,M0 given
where β ∈ (0, 1] denotes the discount factor, and Mt = Mt or Mt+1.
2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
The generalised Lagrangian is
L =
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, qtMt)
+
+∞∑
t=0
βtλt[rtkt + wt + qtMt + τt − ct − pt[kt+1 − (1− δ)kt]− qtMt+1]
with λ the non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (6).
With both timings, the first order conditions with respect to kt+1 is identical
and given by
λtpt = βλt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1] (10)
where rt and pt are defined by (4). However, the first order conditions with
respect to ct and Mt depend on the timing and are given by
λt = u1(ct, qtMt) (11)
λtqt = βqt+1[λt+1 + u2(ct+1, qt+1Mt+1)] (12)
with the CIA timing, or
λt = u1(ct, qtMt+1) (13)
βλt+1qt+1 = qt[λt − u2(ct, qtMt+1)] (14)
with the CAM timing.
By manipulating the first order conditions (10)-(14), we obtain the Euler
equation and the arbitrage condition between consumption and real balances
u1(ct, qtMt)pt = βu1(ct+1, qt+1Mt+1)[rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1]
u1(ct, qtMt)qt = βqt+1[u1(ct+1, qt+1Mt+1) + u2(ct+1, qt+1Mt+1)]
(15)
with the CIA timing, or
u1(ct, qtMt+1)pt = βu1(ct+1, qt+1Mt+2)[rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1]
βu1(ct+1, qt+1Mt+2)qt+1 = qt[u1(ct, qtMt+1)− u2(ct, qtMt+1)]
(16)
with the CAM timing.
In order to complete the definition of the intertemporal equilibrium, we
need to specify the supply of money. We assume that the government follows
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a simple monetary rule: in each period it issues lump-sum transfers of money
balances at the constant rate µ − 1 > 0, so that in period t the supply of
money M st satisfies M
s
t = µ
tM s0 , with M
s
0 = M0 the initial amount of money
balances. Thus nominal transfers are given by τt = (µ− 1)qtM st . Using the
notations mt = qtMt and zt = qtMt+1, we finally get from (15)-(16) and
from the equilibrium on the monetary market M st = Mt:
u1(ct,mt)pt = βu1(ct+1,mt+1)[rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1]
u1(ct,mt)mt =
β
µ
[u1(ct+1,mt+1) + u2(ct+1,mt+1)]mt+1
(17)
with the CIA timing, or
u1(ct, zt)pt = βu1(ct+1, zt+1)[rt+1 + (1− δ)pt+1]
β
µ
u1(ct+1, zt+1)zt+1 = zt[u1(ct, zt)− u2(ct, zt)]
(18)
with the CAM timing.
Taking into account ct = T (kt, yt), rt = T1(kt, yt), pt = −T2(kt, yt) and
yt = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt, we conclude that (17) and (18) are two systems of
implicit difference equations of order 2 in the capital stock k and order 1 in
real money balances m or z.
Any optimal plan for the representative household that satisfies the Eu-
ler equations (17) or (18) and the corresponding following transversality
condition
lim
t→+∞β
tu1(ct, xt)ptkt+1 = 0 (19)
lim
t→+∞β
tu1(ct, xt)xt = 0 (20)
with xt = mt or zt, is called an equilibrium path.
2.4 Steady state
A steady state is defined as kt = k∗, yt = y∗ = δk∗, ct = c∗, pt = p∗ =
−T2(k∗, δk∗), rt = r∗ = T1(k∗, δk∗) and mt = m∗ or zt = z∗ for all t.
Along a stationary solution, we have indeed a decreasing path for the price
of money balances qt+1/qt = 1/µ which is associated with the expansion of
money supply Mt+1/Mt = µ so that at the steady state real money balances
mt or zt remain constant. From the dynamical system (17) and the fact that
c = T (k, δk), the stationary levels of capital k∗ and real money balances m∗
or z∗ are obtained as solutions of
r
p = −T1(k,δk)T2(k,δk) = β−1 − (1− δ) (21)
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and
u2(T (k,δk),m)
u1(T (k,δk),m)
= µβ − 1 (22)
with the CIA timing, or
u2(T (k,δk),z)
u1(T (k,δk),z)
= 1− βµ (23)
with the CAM timing.
As in the standard one-sector Ramsey model, we get the following result:
Proposition 1 . Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists a unique steady state
(k∗,m∗) or (k∗, z∗) solution of equations (21)-(22) or (21)-(23).
The steady states (k∗,m∗) and (k∗, z∗) are called the Modified Golden Rule.
3 Main results
In order to study the local determinacy properties of the steady state, we
need to compute the characteristic roots associated with the linearized Euler
equations around the Modified Golden Rule. At any time t we have one pre-
determinate variable, the current capital stock kt, and two forward variables,
the capital stock of the following period kt+1 and the current real money
balances mt or zt. Local indeterminacy will be obtained if at least two
characteristic roots are inside the unit circle.
Note from equations (21)-(22) that the steady-state (k∗, x∗), with x∗ =
m∗ or z∗, is defined as follows: the capital stock k∗ is only determined
by the technological characteristics, the discount factor β and the rate of
depreciation of capital δ. The properties of preferences only influence the
stationary value of real money balances x∗ = m∗ or z∗. Then for some
given technologies and a given pair (β, δ), the value of k∗ is fixed and it is
easy to consider variations of preferences in order to study the occurrence
of bifurcations. This will be our strategy of proof in the sequel of the paper.
We are looking for the simplest sufficient conditions for the occurrence
of local indeterminacy. In order to derive economically interpretable results,
we introduce, following Benhabib and Nishimura [5], the relative capital
intensity difference across sectors such that
b = l1y
(
k1
l1
− k0l0
)
(24)
The sign of b is positive if and only if the investment good is capital inten-
sive. Note also that the demands for input k0, k1, l0, l1 when evaluated at
the steady state are functions of the discount factor β and the rate of depre-
ciation of capital δ. It follows that the capital intensity difference satisfies
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b = b(β, δ). We also define the elasticities of substitution of consumption
and real money balances evaluated at the steady state12
cc = −ξ−1cc = − (u∗11c∗/u∗1)−1 > 0, xc = −ξ−1xc = − (u∗21c∗/u∗2)−1 (25)
xx = −ξ−1xx = − (u∗22x∗/u∗2)−1 > 0, cx = −ξ−1cx = − (u∗12x∗/u∗1)−1 (26)
with x = m or z, u∗i = u
m
i or u
z
i , u
∗
ij = u
m
ij or u
z
ij , i, j = 1, 2, and the
following elasticities of the consumption good’s output and the rental rate
with respect to the capital stock, all evaluated at the steady state
εck = T ∗1 k
∗/T ∗ > 0, εrk = T ∗11k
∗/T ∗1 < 0 (27)
We will explore the existence of local indeterminacy with CIA and CAM
timings considering successively different specifications for the utility func-
tion which are widely used in the Real Business Cycle literature. We will
then show that the occurrence of business cycles based on self-fulfilling
prophecies depends on an interplay between preferences and the timing for
money.
3.1 Additively separable preferences
Consider the standard case of additively separable preferences.
Assumption 4. ξcm = ξmc = ξcz = ξzc = 0
Let us first assume the CIA timing. We introduce the following critical value
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption:
¯cc =
εck2β(1+β)θ
2
εrk[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]] (28)
with θ = [1− β(1− δ)]−1.
Theorem 1. With the CIA timing, let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then the
modified golden rule (k∗,m∗) is locally indeterminate if and only if the elas-
ticity of the money demand satisfies mm < (µ − β)/2µ and one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
i) the investment good is capital intensive around (k∗,m∗);
ii) the consumption good is capital intensive around (k∗,m∗) with
b ∈ (−∞,−1/(2− δ)] ∪ [−β/(1 + (1− δ)β), 0];
iii) the consumption good is capital intensive around (k∗,m∗) with
b ∈ (−1/(2− δ),−β/[1 + (1− δ)β]) and cc < ¯cc.
12Note that the normality Assumption 3 implies ξcc − ξxc ≤ 0 and ξxx − ξcx ≤ 0.
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The existence of local indeterminacy with the CIA timing is easily ob-
tained as it does not require particular restriction on the capital intensity
difference across sectors. Notice however that it requires a low enough in-
terest rate elasticity of money demand as in the aggregate formulation.13
Let us now consider the CAM timing. Contrary to the previous timing,
local indeterminacy is always ruled out.
Theorem 2. With the CAM timing, let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then the
modified golden rule (k∗, z∗) is always locally determinate.
With additively separable preferences we obtain the same conclusion as in
the case of aggregate models in which b = 0: with the CAM timing, the
equilibrium is unique and endogenous fluctuations based on self-fulfilling
prophecies cannot occur. Note however that within aggregate models, this
conclusion holds for any utility function. We then inquire whether this
conclusion still holds for non-separable specifications. We will show that
this is not the case by considering two different standard specifications of
preferences.14
3.2 GHH preferences
Consider a Greenwood-Hercovitz-Huffman [18] (GHH) formulation such that
u(c, qM) = U(c+G(qM)) (29)
with U(.) and G(.) some increasing and strictly concave functions. Such
a specification implies that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and real money balances depends on the latter only as
u2(c,qM)
u1(c,qM) = G
′(qM)
Let us denote
Gxx = −(ξGxx)−1 = −(G′′(x)x/G′(x))−1 > 0
the elasticity of the function G(x). Using (22) and (23), we derive at the
steady state
G′(m∗) = µ−ββ (30)
with the CIA timing, or
G′(z∗) = µ−βµ (31)
13Theorem 1 generalizes the conclusions obtained by Bosi, Magris and Venditti [9] in a
two-sector economy with CIA constraint.
14See Carlstrom and Fuerst [11].
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with the CAM timing. Let v = c∗/m∗ denote the steady state velocity of
money and z∗ = µm∗. We easily get from (26) that ξcc = ξxc for x = m or
z and
ξcm = ξcc µ−ββv , ξmm = ξcc
µ−β
βv + ξ
G
mm
with the CIA timing, or
ξcz = ξcc µ−βv , ξzz = ξcc
µ−β
v + ξ
G
zz
with the CAM timing.
Consider first the CIA timing. We introduce the following critical value
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption:
¯cc =
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b] > 0 (32)
Considering a particular interval of values for the capital intensity difference
across sectors b we get:
Theorem 3. With the CIA timing, let Assumptions 1-3 hold, b ∈ (−1/(1−
δ),−1/(2−δ)) and consider ¯cc as defined by (32). Then the modified golden
rule (k∗,m∗) is locally indeterminate if cc < ¯cc and Gmm ≤ (µ− β)/2µ.
It is worth noting that local indeterminacy can arise for a broader range
of values for b but complex additional restrictions on technologies involving
the elasticities εck and εrk are necessary. Therefore, as our aim is to pro-
vide the simplest sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy, we focus on
a specific range of values for b. Note also that the condition on the interest
rate elasticity of money demand is the same as in the case of additively
separable preferences. It is worth pointing out finally that negative values
for b are compatible with recent empirical evidences. Building on aggre-
gate Input-Output tables, Takahashi et al. [29] have shown that over the
last 30 years the OECD countries have been characterized by a consumption
good sector which is more capital intensive than the investment good sector.
Consider now the CAM timing. We introduce the following critical value
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption:
˜cc ≡
2
h
µ−β
v(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
+β(1+β)θ2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”i
εrk
εck(1−δ)2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
” > 0 (33)
Again, our strategy is to focus on the simplest sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of local indeterminacy. We then consider a specific set of values
for the capital intensity difference across sectors b and some condition on the
elasticities εck and εrk, although more general conclusions could be obtained
at the price of additional restrictions on the technologies.
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Assumption 5. b ∈ (−1/(1−δ)−,−1/(1−δ)+) with  > 0 small enough,
and limδ→1 εrkεck(1−δ)2 = −∞.
Note from the capital accumulation equation (9) that the first part of As-
sumption 5 implies that around the steady state only small fluctuations of
the capital stock and thus prices are considered.15
Theorem 4. With the CAM timing, let Assumptions 1-3 and 5 hold. Then
there exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and ˜cc > 0 as defined by (33) such that the modified
golden rule (k∗, z∗) is locally indeterminate if δ ∈ (δ, 1) and cc < ˜cc.
The conclusion provided by Theorem 4 is important as it shows that contrary
to the aggregate formulation with b = 0, there exists some non-separable
specification for preferences which allows for the existence of local indeter-
minacy when the consumption good sector is sufficiently capital intensive
with respect to the investment good sector. Theorem 4 therefore shows that
uniqueness no longer holds with the CAM timing if two sectors which are
sufficiently asymmetric are considered.
3.3 KPR preferences
Consider a King-Plosser-Rebelo [21] (KPR) formulation such that
u(c, x) = [cg(x)]
1−φ
1−φ (34)
which is compatible with balanced growth. Let us define h(x) = g′(x)/g(x)
and
ψ(x) = xh(x), η(x) = xh
′(x)
h(x) (35)
Beside Assumption 3, we introduce the following restrictions:
Assumption 6. g(x) is a positive increasing function, φ ≥ 0, η(x) ≤
−ψ(x)(1− φ) and η(x) ≤ ψ(x)(1− 1/φ). Moreover limx→0 h(x) = +∞ and
limx→+∞ h(x) = 0
Assumption 6 implies that Assumption 2 holds.16 Note that ψ(x) > 0 can
be interpreted as the elasticity of the utility of real money balances and
η(x) < 0 is linked to the interest rate elasticity of real money demand.
Using (22) and (23) and considering that z∗ = µm∗ and v∗ = c∗/m∗, we
derive at the steady state
ψ(m∗) = µ−ββv∗ (36)
15We have indeed under Assumption 5: dkt+1/dkt = 1− δ+ dyt/dkt = 1− δ+ 1/b ≈ 0.
16See Hintermaier [19, 20] and Pintus [25].
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with the CIA timing, or
ψ(z∗) = µ−βv∗ (37)
with the CAM timing. We then easily get from (26) that ξcc = −φ, ξxc =
1 + ξcc for x = m or z and
ξcm = (1 + ξcc)µ−ββv∗ , ξmm = ξcm + η(m
∗)
with the CIA timing, or
ξcz = (1 + ξcc)µ−βv∗ , ξzz = ξcz + η(z
∗)
with the CAM timing.
Consider first the CIA timing and let η = η(m∗). We proceed as in the
case of GHH preferences and focus on a particular interval of values for b.
Theorem 5. With the CIA timing, let Assumptions 1-3 and 6 hold, b ∈
(−1/(1−δ),−1/(2−δ)) and η ≤ −2µ/(µ−β). Then there exists ¯cc < 0 such
that the modified golden rule (k∗,m∗) is locally indeterminate if cc < ¯cc.
Again it is worth to mention that local indeterminacy can arise for a broader
range of values of b but complex additional restrictions on technologies in-
volving the elasticities εck and εrk are necessary. Note also that the condition
on the elasticity η is the same as in the cases of additively separable and
GHH preferences since it implies to consider a low enough interest rate elas-
ticity of real money demand.
Consider now the CAM timing and let η = η(z∗). We introduce the
following critical value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption:
˜cc ≡ min
{
β−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv∗ )
(µ−β)2
v∗
,
2µ−β
v∗
2+µ−β
v∗
“
2− ηv∗
β
”
}
> 0 (38)
We also proceed as in the case of GHH preferences and consider a specific
set of values for b which is far enough from zero and which implies that
around the steady state, the fluctuations of prices are small.
Theorem 6. With the CAM timing, let Assumptions 1-3, 5 and 6 hold.
Then there exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and ˜cc > 0 as defined by (38) such that the
modified golden rule (k∗, z∗) is locally indeterminate if δ ∈ (δ, 1) and cc =
1/φ < ˜cc.
Theorem 6 confirms the conclusion given by Theorem 4 in the case of a
GHH utility function: it proves that there exist standard non-separable
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specifications of preferences for which local indeterminacy arises with both
formulations of the timing for money. These results are based on a capital
intensity difference across sectors which is sufficiently negative and show that
two-sector models lead to a greater flexibility in terms of local indeterminacy
of equilibrium paths than aggregate models.
4 Example
We do not consider additively separable preferences as we have shown that
the main conclusions are similar to those obtained with an aggregate formu-
lation. Moreover, we focus on the CAM timing as the proof of existence of
local indeterminacy in this case is the main contribution of our paper.
Assume that preferences are given either by a GHH utility function
uGHH(c, x) = 11−ϕ
(
c+ ζ x
1−ν
1−ν
)1−ϕ
(39)
or a KPR utility function
uKPR(c, x) = 11−φ
(
cx
1+ρ
1+ρ
)1−φ
(40)
with ϕ, ν, φ ≥ 0, ρ > −1 and ζ > 0. Consider also the following CES
technologies:
f0(k0, l0) =
[
χk−σ0 + (1− χ)l−σ0
]−1/σ = y0
f1(k1, l1) = min{k1/γ, l1} = y
with χ ∈ (0, 1), σ > −1 and γ > 0. Since at the equilibrium y = k1/γ = l1,
we get k0 = k − γy, l0 = 1− y and thus the social production function
T (k, y) =
[
χ(k − γy)−σ + (1− χ)(1− y)−σ]−1/σ
Assuming that βθ − γ > 0, the steady state for capital is
k∗ =
[(
1−χ
χ
1
βθ−γ
)1/(1+σ)
(1− γδ) + δ
]−1
and since y∗ = δk∗, we easily derive
ε∗rk
ε∗ck
= −(1 + σ)
(
1−χ
χ
)1/(1+σ)
(βθ − γ)σ/(1+σ) < 0
b = γ −
[
χ(βθ−γ)
1−χ
]1/(1+σ)
As a result we have b = −1/(1− δ) if and only if(
1−χ
χ
1
βθ−γ
)1/(1+σ)
= 1−δ1+γ(1−δ)
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Obviously, the previous equality holds if χ = χˆ as given by
χˆ =
[
1 + (βθ − γ)
(
1−δ
1+γ(1−δ)
)1+σ]−1
Moreover, when χ = χˆ we have(
1−χˆ
χˆ
)1/(1+σ)
= (1−δ)(βθ−γ)
1/(1+σ)
1+γ(1−δ)
and thus we get
ε∗rk
ε∗ck
= −(1 + σ) (1−δ)(βθ−γ)1+γ(1−δ)
so that
εrk
εck(1−δ)2 = −
(1+σ)(βθ−γ)
(1−δ)[1+γ(1−δ)]
As θ ∈ [0, 1] for any δ ∈ [0, 1], Assumption 5 is satisfied. We also derive
k∗ = 1 + γ(1− δ) which leads to
c∗ = T (k∗, δk∗) = (1− γδ)
[
[1+γ(1−δ)]1+σ+(βθ−γ)(1−δ)1+σ
θ
]1/σ
(41)
Consider first the case of GHH preferences. Solving the first order con-
dition (23) using (39) gives at the steady state
z∗ = µm∗ =
(
µ−β
ζµ
)−1/ν
and we derive from (41) the stationary velocity of money
v∗ ≡ c∗/m∗ = µ
(
µ−β
ζµ
)1/ν
(1− γδ)
[
[1+γ(1−δ)]1+σ+(βθ−γ)(1−δ)1+σ
θ
]1/σ
It follows from (39) that
cc = 1ϕ +
µ−β
ϕ(1−ν)v∗
Moreover, as ξGxx = −ν for all x > 0, we derive from (33) the following critical
value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption:
˜cc ≡ 2β
[
µ−β
v∗[2β+(µ−β)ν] − (1+β)θ
2(1−δ)[1+γ(1−δ)]
(1+σ)(βθ−γ)
]
The critical bound δ ∈ [0, 1) is obtained as the value of δ such that the
expression between brackets on the right-hand-side is greater or equal to
zero.17 Assuming δ ∈ (δ, 1), we conclude that there exists ϕ > 0 such that
17Note that δ = 0 if
µ−β
2β+(µ−β)ν ≥
(1+β)(1+γ)µ
“
µ−β
ζµ
”1/ν
[(1−β)[(1+γ)1+σ−γ]+β]1/σ
(1+σ)(1−β)[β−γ(1−β)]
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cc < ˜cc, and thus local indeterminacy arises, if ϕ > ϕ.
Consider now the case of KPR preferences. We derive from (40) that
ψ(x) = 1 + ρ and η(x) = −1 for all x > 0. Assumption 6 then requires
1 ≥ (1+ρ)(1−φ) and 1 ≥ (1+ρ)(1−φ)/φ. Solving the first order condition
(23) with z = µm gives the stationary velocity of money
v∗ ≡ c∗/m∗ = µ−β1+ρ
Using (38) we derive the following critical value for the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption:
˜cc ≡ 2β(1+ρ)µ+β+2β(1+ρ)
Therefore, there exists φ > 0 such that Assumption 6 holds and
cc ≡ 1φ < ˜cc
if φ > φ. Under this restriction we derive the critical bound δ ∈ (0, 1) as
the value of δ such that the following equation is satisfied
βθ−γ
(1−δ)[1+γ(1−δ)]βθ2 = 2
1+β
1+σ
(1−φ)(1+ρ)µ−β
µ+β
−φ
(1−φ)(1+ρ) 2β
µ+β
+1
We then conclude that local indeterminacy arises if φ > φ and δ ∈ (δ, 1).
5 Concluding comments
We have considered a two-sector MIUF model with general technologies and
preferences defined on the basis of three popular specifications of the util-
ity function in the business cycle and growth literature: i) an additively
separable formulation, ii) a KPR formulation, and iii) a GHH formulation.
The CIA and CAM timings have been systematically compared throughout
the paper. First, we have shown that for all the three different specifica-
tions of preferences, local indeterminacy with a CIA timing requires a low
enough interest rate elasticity of money demand. Second, and contrary to
the aggregate formulation, we have proved the possible existence of local
indeterminacy with a CAM timing depending on the utility function. While
we have shown that determinacy always holds under separable preferences,
we have provided simple sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy in the
case of GHH [18] and KPR [21] preferences. Explicit examples with CES
technologies have also been given to illustrate these theoretical findings. We
have thus proved that compared to aggregate models, two-sector models
provide new rooms for local indeterminacy when non-separable standard
preferences are considered.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider in a first step equation (21). Note that the steady state value of k
only depends on the characteristics of the technologies and is independent
of the per-period utility function. The proof of Theorem 3.1 in Becker and
Tsyganov [3] restricted to the case of one homogeneous agent applies so that
there exists a unique k∗ solution of (21).
Consider in a second step equations (22) and (23) evaluated at k∗. We
then write these two conditions as:
u2(T (k∗,δk∗),x)
u1(T (k∗,δk∗),x) ≡ Θ(x) = pi
with (x, pi) = (m,µ/β − 1) or (z, 1− β/µ). The function Θ(x) satisfies
Θ′(x) = u22u1−u12u2
u21
The normality Assumption 3 implies that for any x > 0, Θ′(x) < 0. This
monotonicity property together with the boundary conditions in Assumption
2 finally guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution m∗ or z∗ of
equation (22) or (23).
6.2 The characteristic polynomial
In order to derive a tractable formulation for the third-degree polynomial
associated with the dynamical system (17), we need to compute the second
derivatives of T (k, y). Let b be the capital intensity difference across sectors
as defined by (24). We know from Benhabib and Nishimura [5] that
T12 = −T11b, T22 = T11b2 (42)
with T11 < 0 implied by the concavity of T (k, y).
As shown previously, the steady states (k∗,m∗) and (k∗, z∗) are charac-
terized by equations (21)-(23) which can be written as follows
−T ∗2 β−1 = T ∗1 − (1− δ)T ∗2 (43)
um1 =
β
µ
(um1 + u
m
2 ) (44)
β
µ
uz1 = u
z
1 − uz2 (45)
with T ∗i = Ti(k
∗, δk∗), umi = ui(c
∗,m∗) and uzi = ui(c
∗, z∗). In the following
we will also consider a second formulation for equation (43)
−T ∗2 = βθT ∗1 (46)
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with θ = [1 − β(1 − δ)]−1. The second derivatives of the function T (k, y)
will be evaluated at k∗ using the following notation: T ∗ij = Tij(k
∗, δk∗).
Using equations (25)-(27) and (42)-(46), and denoting dκt = dkt+1, total
differenciation of the Euler equations (17) gives after tedious but straight-
forward computations the following linear system 0 −βAm1 Am20 βAm3 Am4
1 0 0
 dkt+1dκt+1
dmt+1

=
 Am1 Am5 Am2−ξccθ ξccβθ +Am3 − c∗m∗T ∗1 (1 + ξcm)
0 1 0
 dktdκt
dmt

where
Am1 = βθ2ξcc + εrkεck b[1 + (1− δ)b]
Am2 = θT ∗1 ξmc(µ− β)
Am3 = θµ [ξccβ + ξmc(µ− β)]
Am4 = − c
∗
m∗T ∗1
[
1 + 1µ
(
ξcmβ + ξmm(µ− β)
)]
Am5 = −β(1 + β)θ2ξcc − εrkεck
[
b2 + β[1 + (1− δ)b]2
]
> 0
with the CIA timing, or Az1 −βAz2
ξcz
θεck
ξcc −βξcc 1+ξczθεck
1 0 0

 dkt+1/kdκt+1/κ
dzt+1/z
 =
 Az2 −βAz3
ξcz
θεck
Az4 −βAz4 1+A
z
5
θεck
0 1 0

 dkt/kdκt/κ
dzt/z

where
Az1 = ξcc + εrkεck
[
1+(1−δ)b
θ
]2
< 0
Az2 = ξcc + εrkεck bβθ
1+(1−δ)b
θ
Az3 = ξcc + εrkεck
(
b
βθ
)2
< 0
Az4 = µβ ξcc +
(
1− µβ
)
ξzc
Az5 = µβ ξcz +
(
1− µβ
)
ξzz
with the CAM timing.
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Assuming that with both timings the matrix on the left-hand-side is non-
singular, the following lemma provides a formulation for the characteristic
polynomial:
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, let Am1 Am4 +Am2 Am3 6= 0 and Az2 (1 + ξcz)−
ξccξcz 6= 0. The characteristic polynomial is
P(λ) = λ3 − T λ2 + Sλ−D (47)
where
D =
Am2 ξccθ−
Am1 c∗
T∗1m∗
(1+ξcm)
β(Am1 Am4 +Am2 Am3 )
S = 1β +
Am2 ξccθ(1+β)+
Am5 c∗
T∗1m∗
(1+ξcm)
β(Am1 Am4 +Am2 Am3 )
T = βD + Am2 Am3 (1+β)−Am4 Am5β(Am1 Am4 +Am2 Am3 )
with the CIA timing, or
D = Az2(1+A5)−Az4ξcz
β[Az2(1+ξcz)−ξccξcz]
S = 1β +
(βAz3+Az1)(1+Az5)−Az4ξcz(1+β)
β[Az2(1+ξcz)−ξccξcz]
T = βD + (βAz3+Az1)(1+ξcz)−ξccξcz(1+β)
β[Az2(1+ξcz)−ξccξcz]
with the CAM timing.
Proof : Considering that ξcmβ(c∗/m∗) = ξmc(µ − β) and ξczµ(c∗/z∗) =
ξzc(µ− β), tedious but straightforward computations give the result.
In the sequel, the local stability analysis will be derived considering the
characteristic polynomial evaluated at λ = 1, λ = 0 and λ = −1. We easily
compute from Lemma 1:
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
µ
εrk
εck
(1−δb)(β−θ−1b)(ξmm−ξcm)
βθ2ξcc+(1+ξcm)
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
P(−1)
P(0) =
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
h
2+ 1
µ
[ξcm(µ+β)+ξmm(µ−β)]
i
βθ2ξcc+(1+ξcm)
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
+
2β(1+β)θ2
h
2ξcc+
µ−β
µ
(ξccξmm−ξcmξmc)
i
βθ2ξcc+(1+ξcm)
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
(48)
with the CIA timing, and
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P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
β
(ξzz−ξcz) (1−δb)(β−θ
−1b)
βθ2
εrk
εck
ξcc+(1+ξcz)
1+(1−δ)b
θ
b
βθ
εrk
εck
−µ−β
β
h
ξccξzz−ξczξzc+(ξzz−ξcz) 1+(1−δ)bθ bβθ
εrk
εck
i
P(−1)
P(0) =
h
2(1+ξcz)−µ−ββ (ξzz−ξcz)
ih
1+(1−δ)b
θ
+ b
θ
ih
1+(1−δ)b
θ
+ b
βθ
i
εrk
εck
ξcc+(1+ξcz)
1+(1−δ)b
θ
b
βθ
εrk
εck
−µ−β
β
h
ξccξzz−ξczξzc+(ξzz−ξcz) 1+(1−δ)bθ bβθ
εrk
εck
i
+
2(1+β)
h
2ξcc−µ−ββ (ξccξzz−ξczξzc)
i
ξcc+(1+ξcz)
1+(1−δ)b
θ
b
βθ
εrk
εck
−µ−β
β
h
ξccξzz−ξczξzc+(ξzz−ξcz) 1+(1−δ)bθ bβθ
εrk
εck
i
(49)
with the CAM timing.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Under Assumption 4 we derive from Lemma 1 that
D = 1
β
h
1+ξmm
µ−β
µ
i , S = 1β − Am5Am1 D, T = βD − A
m
5
βAm1
and thus the characteristic polynomial rewrites as
P(λ) =
(
λ2 + λ A
m
5
βAm1 +
1
β
)
(λ− βD)
=
(
λ2 − λβ(1+β)θ
2ξcc+
εrk
εck
[b2+β[1+(1−δ)b]2]
β
h
βθ2ξcc+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
i + 1β
)
(λ− βD)
≡ P˜(λ) (λ− βD)
(50)
Therefore, when the utility is additively separable, the characteristic roots
are separated. Note that P˜(λ) corresponds to the second-degree charac-
teristic polynomial obtained within a standard two-sector optimal growth
model without money (see Bosi, Magris and Venditti [8]). It follows that
one characteristic root is within the unit circle while the other is outside in
the following cases:
i) b ∈ (−∞,−1/(2− δ)] ∪ [−β/(1 + (1− δ)β), βθ),
ii) b ∈ (−1/(2− δ),−β/[1 + (1− δ)β]) and
ξcc < −
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
2β(1+β)θ2
≡ ξ¯cc
The third characteristic root is obviously derived from (50) and depends on
money as
λ = βD = 1
1+ξmm
µ−β
µ
Therefore, λ ∈ (−1, 0) if and only if ξmm < −2µ/(µ − β). Let ¯cc = −ξ¯−1cc
and ¯mm = (µ− β)/(2µ). The final results follow from (25) and (26).
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Under Assumption 4 we derive from Lemma 1 that
D = 1−
“
µ−β
β
”
ξzz
β , S = 1β + βD
( Az1
βAz2 +
Az3
Az2
)
, T = βD + Az1βAz2 +
Az3
Az2
and thus the characteristic polynomial rewrites as
P(λ) =
(
λ2 − λ
[ Az1
βAz2 +
Az3
Az2
]
+ 1β
)
(λ− βD)
= P˜(λ) (λ− βD)
(51)
with P˜(λ) as defined by (50). As in the CIA timing the characteristic roots
are separated, and the first two characteristic roots have the same properties
as in the proof of Theorem 1. The third root satisfies
λ = βD = 1− µ−ββ ξzz > 1
The result follows from (26).
6.5 Proof of Theorem 3
When the utility function assumes the GHH formulation, we have with the
CIA timing
ξcc = ξmc, ξcm = ξcc µ−ββv , ξmm = ξcc
µ−β
βv + ξ
G
mm
It follows from (48) that
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
µ
εrk
εck
(1−δb)(β−θ−1b)ξGmm
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
P(−1)
P(0) =
2ξcc
h
µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]+β(1+β)θ2
“
2+µ−β
µ
ξGmm
”i
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
+
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
“
2+µ−β
µ
ξGmm
”
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
Local indeterminacy will be obtained if P(1)/P(0) < 0 and P(−1)/P(0) < 0.
Assume that b ∈ (−1/(1− δ),−1/(2− δ)), and consider first P(1)/P(0). As
the numerator is positive and b[1+(1−δ)b] < 0, the denominator is negative,
and thus P(1)/P(0) < 0, if
ξcc < −
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b] ≡ ξ¯cc
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Consider then P(−1)/P(0). As the denominator is negative, P(−1)/P(0) <
0 if the numerator is positive. Since [1 + (2− δ)b] [β + b[1 + (1− δ)β]] > 0,
we get a positive numerator if
2 + µ−βµ ξ
G
mm ≤ 0
The result follows.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 4
When the utility function assumes the GHH formulation, we have with the
CAM timing
ξcc = ξzc, ξcz = ξcc µ−βv , ξzz = ξcc
µ−β
v + ξ
G
zz
It follows from (49) that
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
β
εrk
εck
(1−δb)(β−θ−1b)ξGzz
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
v
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−µ−β
β
βθ2ξGzz
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
P(−1)
P(0) =
2ξcc
h
µ−β
v
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]+β(1+β)θ2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”i
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
v
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−µ−β
β
βθ2ξGzz
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
+
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
v
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−µ−β
β
βθ2ξGzz
”
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
Local indeterminacy occurs if P(1)/P(0) < 0 and P(−1)/P(0) < 0. Assume
then that 1 + (1− δ)b = 0, i.e. b = −1/(1− δ). After simplifiying we get
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
β(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
ξGzz
βθ2ξcc
“
1−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
P(−1)
P(0) =
2ξcc
h
µ−β
v(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
+β(1+β)θ2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”i
+
εrk
εck(1−δ)2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
βθ2ξcc
“
1−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
Consider first P(1)/P(0). The numerator is positive while the denominator
is negative, so that P(1)/P(0) < 0. Consider then P(−1)/P(0). As the
denominator is negative, P(−1)/P(0) < 0 if the numerator is positive. A
necessary condition for this is given by the following condition
µ−β
v(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
+ β(1 + β)θ2
(
2− µ−ββ ξGzz
)
< 0
Assume that
lim
δ→1
εrk
εck(1−δ)2 = −∞
22
Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ ∈ (δ, 1), this inequality is
satisfied. We conclude that when δ ∈ (δ, 1), the numerator is positive if
ξcc < −
εrk
εck(1−δ)2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”
2
h
µ−β
v(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
+β(1+β)θ2
“
2−µ−β
β
ξGzz
”i ≡ ξ˜cc
The result follows.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 5
When the utility function assumes the KPR formulation, we have with the
CIA timing
ξcc = −φ, ξzc = 1 + ξcc, ξcz = (1 + ξcc)µ−ββv , ξzz = ξcz + η
with η = η(m∗) < 0. It follows from (48) that
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
µ
εrk
εck
(1−δb)(β−θ−1b)η
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
“
1+µ−β
βv
”
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
P(−1)
P(0) =
2ξcc
n
µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]+β(1+β)θ2
h
2+µ−β
µ
“
η−µ−β
βv
”io
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
“
1+µ−β
βv
”
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
+
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
“
2+
η(µ−β)
µ
+2µ−β
βv
”
−2β(1+β)θ2 (µ−β)2
µβv
ξcc
“
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
”
+
“
1+µ−β
βv
”
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
Local indeterminacy will be obtained if P(1)/P(0) < 0 and P(−1)/P(0) < 0.
Assume that b ∈ (−1/(1− δ),−1/(2− δ)), and consider first P(1)/P(0). As
the numerator is positive and b[1+(1−δ)b] < 0, the denominator is negative,
and thus P(1)/P(0) < 0, if
ξcc < −
“
1+µ−β
βv
”
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
βθ2+µ−β
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b] ≡ ξ
1
cc
Consider then P(−1)/P(0). As the denominator is negative, P(−1)/P(0) <
0 if the numerator is positive. Consider the term between brackets in the
numerator which is multiplied to ξcc. Since [1 + (2− δ)b] [β+b[1+(1−δ)β]] >
0, a sufficient condition to get a negative expression is
2 + µ−βµ η ≤ 0
If this inequality holds we have limξcc→−∞ P(−1)/P(0) = −∞. Therefore,
there exists ξ2cc < 0 such that P(−1)/P(0) < 0 when ξcc < ξ2cc. The result
follows by taking ξ¯cc = min{ξ1cc, ξ2cc}.
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6.8 Proof of Theorem 6
When the utility function assumes the KPR formulation, we have with the
CAM timing
ξcc = −φ, ξzc = 1 + ξcc, ξcz = (1 + ξcc)µ−βv , ξzz = ξcz + η
with η = η(z∗) < 0. It follows from (49) that
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
β
εrk
εck
(1−δb)(β−θ−1b)η
ξcc
h
βθ2− (µ−β)µ
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )θ2
i
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1− (µ−β)µ
βv
”
+
(µ−β)2
v
θ2
P(−1)
P(0) =
2ξcc
n
µ−β
v
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]+β(1+β)θ2
h
2−µ−β
β (η−µ−βv )
io
ξcc
h
βθ2− (µ−β)µ
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )θ2
i
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1− (µ−β)µ
βv
”
+
(µ−β)2
v
θ2
+
εrk
εck
[1+(2−δ)b][β+b[1+(1−δ)β]]
h
2+µ−β
v
“
2− ηv
β
”i
+2(1+β)θ2
(µ−β)2
v
ξcc
h
βθ2− (µ−β)µ
βv
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )θ2
i
+
εrk
εck
b[1+(1−δ)b]
“
1− (µ−β)µ
βv
”
+
(µ−β)2
v
θ2
Local indeterminacy will be obtained if P(1)/P(0) < 0 and P(−1)/P(0) < 0.
Assume then that 1 + (1 − δ)b = 0, i.e. b = −1/(1 − δ). Straightforward
simplifications give
P(1)
P(0) =
µ−β
β(1−δ)2
εrk
εck
η
ξccθ2[β−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )]+
(µ−β)2
v
θ2
P(−1)
P(0) =
εrk
εck(1−δ)2
h
2+µ−β
v
“
2− ηv
β
”
+2ξcc
µ−β
v
i
+2β(1+β)θ2

ξcc
h
2−µ−β
β (η−µ−βv )
i
+
(µ−β)2
βv
ff
ξccθ2[β−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )]+
(µ−β)2
v
θ2
Consider first P(1)/P(0). Since the numerator is positive, P(1)/P(0) < 0 if
the denominator is negative, i.e. if
ξcc < −
(µ−β)2
v
β−(µ−β)(η−µ−βv )
≡ ξ1cc
Consider then P(−1)/P(0). As the denominator is negative, P(−1)/P(0) <
0 if the numerator is positive. Assume that the term between brackets which
is pre-multiplied by the ratio εrk/εck is negative, namely
2 + µ−βv
(
2− ηvβ
)
+ 2ξcc µ−βv < 0
⇔ ξcc < −
2+µ−β
v
“
2− ηv
β
”
2µ−β
v
≡ ξ2cc
Assume also that
lim
δ→1
εrk
εck(1−δ)2 = −∞
Under these two conditions we get limδ→1 P(−1)/P(0) = −∞. Therefore,
there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that P(−1)/P(0) < 0 for any δ ∈ (δ, 1). The
result follows by taking ξ˜cc = min{ξ1cc, ξ2cc}.
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